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A Madisonian Reform
Greg Weiner
In 1992 ,  news  brok e  that the House of Representatives’ bank allowed members of Congress to overdraw their accounts without 
penalty, sometimes for thousands of dollars, in a scheme of systematic 
check kiting. That was also the year the House Post Office scandal broke. 
It featured embezzlement and money-laundering and eventually sent 
Democratic representative Dan Rostenkowski of Illinois, the legendary 
chair of the Ways and Means Committee and one of the lions of Capitol 
Hill, tumbling from grace and toward federal prison.
Out of such incidents, the contemporary movement for congressio-
nal term limitation grew. In the earthquake election of 1994, House 
speaker Tom Foley, a Democrat from Spokane, Washington, who had 
successfully sued to block term limits imposed by the state, went down 
to defeat at the hands of newcomer George Nethercutt, who cam-
paigned on a pledge to serve only three terms — a commitment that, 
having tasted the pleasures of public office, he later found himself un-
able to keep.
The public sense was that members of Congress had lost touch with 
their constituents, and the exclusive privileges — financial and other-
wise — they had granted themselves served as proof. The term-limit 
movement wanted to renew the concept of the citizen-legislator and 
forcibly evict the corrupt and entrenched.
This was inauspicious soil in which to plant the reform. The citizen- 
legislator is a romantic ideal probably never approximated in American 
history and certainly not practiced at the founding. More impor-
tant, properly understood, term limits are not punitive. As George 
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Will suggested in the title of his definitive 1992 study of the sub-
ject — Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of Deliberative 
Democracy — they are restorative. They are an imperfect but Madisonian 
reform that targets what should be the motive force of constitutional 
government: the desire to exercise power. 
Without both restoring this motive for congressional service and 
impeding other ones, no reform of Congress can succeed. The most 
commonly cited legislative reforms, such as restoring the regular order 
or reviving the war power, assume Congress will make use of them. In 
the argot of Federalist No. 51, they are constitutional means without 
personal motives.
The best argument for term limitation is that it might restore the 
desire for power by altering the kind of person attracted to congressio-
nal service: not careerists who serve for the sake of careerism, or those 
entranced by the aura of empty authority, but rather those interested 
in power’s actual exercise. By compressing congressional service into a 
limited span of time, term limits would help to close off un-Madisonian 
motives for seeking the office.
We need not assume those motives are either venal or virtuous. 
Edmund Burke wisely counseled the Sheriffs of Bristol against cheap 
cynicism: “I hope there are none of you corrupted with the doctrine 
taught by wicked men for the worst purposes, and received by the ma-
lignant credulity of envy and ignorance, which is, that the men who act 
upon the public stage are all alike, all equally corrupt, all influenced 
by no other views than the sordid lure of salary and pension. . . . Never 
expecting to find perfection in men, and not looking for divine attri-
butes in created beings, in my commerce with my contemporaries I 
have found much human virtue.” 
There is surely much virtue in Congress too. The predominant is-
sue is not corruption but rather indifference to power. Some members 
are surely interested in the lucrative opportunities that accrue to well-
connected former members of Congress. Others may believe loyalty or 
opposition to the president rather than fealty to their own branch of 
government is genuinely the best means of achieving their policy objec-
tives. Nor would it be surprising or scandalous if many simply like the 
job and want to keep it.
In any of these instances, the irony of careerism is that it has cor-
roded the substance of the very office that members of Congress seem so 
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eager to retain. Put otherwise, members of Congress are clinging to the 
shells of their offices while emptying them of power. Term limits offer 
the promise — though not a guarantee, and not without risk — of restor-
ing the motive for power by altering the incentives for those who serve 
while inducing a different kind of person to pursue congressional office.
The case distills to this: With a limited tenure awaiting a new mem-
ber, and the returns on any given election thus diminishing, why serve 
unless it is to assert one’s authority for purposes that conduce to a view 
of the public good? Glamour is always attractive but is less likely to be 
addictive when administered in limited doses. Term-limited members of 
Congress would be less able to monetize relationships of short duration. 
The knowledge that one cannot be re-elected permanently reduces the 
urgency of each intervening election, freeing members of Congress to, 
as Federalist No. 10 puts it, refine and enlarge the public’s views rather 
than punting the responsibility to executive agencies or courts. 
Put in terms of another passage from Federalist No. 10, enlightened 
statesmen will not always be at the helm. But those at the tiller for brief pe-
riods rather than leisurely journeys may be likelier to try to steer the ship.
Power Powers the regime
In Federalist No. 51, Madison famously maintains the separation of 
powers — the combination of which he described in Federalist No. 47 
as “the very definition of tyranny” — by matching means with motives: 
“The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place.” But what is the “personal motive” to which he 
refers, the “[a]mbition [that] must be made to counteract ambition”?
To see what it was and how it has changed, it is necessary to revisit 
the late-18th and early-19th centuries. The United States was an infant na-
tion, not an imperial power. Washington, D.C., when it was built, was 
better known for malaria than for the high culture of a world capital. 
Foreign diplomats needed hazardous-duty pay to be induced to serve 
there. Members of Congress were neither celebrities nor villains. They 
served in relative anonymity, spending months away from home and 
family, in an office that was neither directly nor indirectly lucrative.
That is not to say they were citizen-legislators: Madison’s ideal leg-
islator is a “fit character” who is a cut above the community, not the 
neighbor next door. Many served for lengthy spans. Madison himself 
spent nearly all his working life in political office, though he interspersed 
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his federal with state service. But none of them would have seen a seat 
in Congress as an end unto itself.
Instead, Federalist No. 51 assumes the motive for serving is political 
man’s ambition to exercise power. That is the personal motive that in-
duces him to utilize his available constitutional means. In his seminars, 
Georgetown professor George Carey illustrated the point by challeng-
ing students to imagine a president who tells members of Congress they 
can exercise executive power so long as they continue to supply all he 
really wants: a luxury jet, a Praetorian Guard, a prestigious address, and 
other trappings of authority.
The thought experiment fails precisely because we assume presidents 
want power. Power, to be sure, is morally neutral: Presidents need it 
whether they want to do good or ill, but regardless, they almost invari-
ably seek it. Some historians’ standard of presidential success is whether 
an occupant of the office managed not to merely defend but actually to 
expand its power. The idea of a president being motivated primarily by 
the perquisites that accrue to the office, and not at all by its authority, 
seems absurd. 
Is such a view of contemporary members of Congress so unthinkable? 
The legislature that Madison called an “impetuous vortex” that would 
absorb all powers if not limited has instead been eager to surrender them. 
There are ample illustrations, from the Clean Air Act to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, of Congress declaring broad goals yet leaving to 
the executive branch the actually meaningful power to make the trad-
eoffs and specify the policies they entail. Congress does not declare wars 
anymore and largely does not object when presidents circumvent the 
treaty power with executive agreements. Even the feeble War Powers 
Act has been eviscerated by persistent presidential practice without seri-
ous congressional objection. Meanwhile, legislators are equally eager to 
dodge responsibility by deferring to the courts, which now routinely 
make quasi-legislative decisions — and sometimes patently legislative 
ones — and must referee disputes over the separation of powers.
Why, then, serve? Running for Congress is surely unpleasant. Sitting 
in the body — with its manic schedule and manifold opportunities for 
engendering enmity — cannot be much better, and neither is it espe-
cially remunerative. Yet even as they peddle such bromides as “giving 
back” and “serving the public,” members of Congress pursue re-election 
with a frantic urgency that suggests some personal need for the job.
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There are several possible incentives Madison may not have foreseen 
from his late-18th and early-19th century perch. Status — the unhealthy 
iteration of the “love of fame” that Hamilton’s Federalist No. 72 called 
“the ruling passion of the noblest minds” — is almost certainly a promi-
nent one that often seduces even those who come to the capital with 
wide-eyed sincerity. 
Even if they do not exercise power, members of Congress inhabit an 
atmosphere suffused with it, fueled by the country’s global status as well 
as the national government’s inflated authority. They receive lapel pins 
designating their office. They brush past security barriers manned by 
police officers whose deference enhances the members’ sense of impor-
tance. Their proximity to the power of the president, swollen beyond 
recognition, is a further inducement evident in perquisites ranging from 
invitations to the White House to rides on Air Force One. 
As Yuval Levin has observed, their function is now largely performa-
tive, which is consistent with a love of status rather than an ambition for 
power. Members of Congress have access to platforms, from cable news 
to social media, that cause them to be seen in ways their distant prede-
cessors never were. Today’s members are heroes to some and villains to 
others, but they rarely go unnoticed.
There are pecuniary motives for serving as well, though one sus-
pects these are only occasionally determinative. In few cases does this 
mean either the job’s salary — which is usually modest compared to 
what individuals of their motivation and talent can earn in the private 
sector — or its generous retirement benefits, without which interrupt-
ing a career for even a brief period would be irrational. The payoff 
generally comes later, and it is inseparable from careerism. The fact 
that so many former members of Congress follow their tenure in of-
fice with profitable jobs in lobbying, government contracting, or other 
fields related to their service suggests their employers or clients value 
their relationships at a premium.
For the Madisonian machinery to operate according to plan, motives 
like these must be curtailed while the one that matters — power — is re-
stored. There are reforms short of term limits that would help. Prying 
open the notoriously lock-jawed amendment processes that have recently 
stymied both the House and Senate, for example, could give members a 
taste of power that might encourage its further exercise. But these reforms 
still assume a certain type of power-seeking person will covet legislative 
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office, and they do not solve the riddle of why members who are so frus-
trated in the exercise of power continue to seek re-election. It seems safe 
to say that whatever their primary motive may be, power is not it.
the Aur A of Power
John Adams wrote in his Discourses on Davila that all men were moved 
by “the passion for distinction. A desire to be observed, considered, es-
teemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows, is one of the 
earliest, as well as keenest dispositions discovered in the heart of man.” 
The key word here is “observed,” for Adams, like Lincoln in the Lyceum 
Address, felt that anonymity was so painful that political man would 
prefer distinction in villainy to obscurity with honor. 
When the passion for distinction is achieved by the pursuit of truth 
and virtue, Adams calls it “emulation”; when by power, it is “ambition.” 
What is it when it is simply vapid: the desire to occupy a position of po-
tential power not for its exercise but rather for its aura? Adams seems to 
lack a category for the desire for celebrity or the temptation of power’s 
mere shell without its contents. For Adams, the desire to be observed 
was conjoined with the desire to be admired. In contemporary politics, 
the terminus of the motive is often the desire simply to be known and 
to breathe the same air as those with actual power.
Perhaps it has long been so; in any case we should beware the as-
sumption of a golden age of legislating. As early as his 1885 treatise 
Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, the young politi-
cal scientist Woodrow Wilson painted a pathetic image of the freshman 
entering the House:
The newly-elected member, entering its doors for the first time, 
and with no more knowledge of its rules and customs than the 
more intelligent of his constituents possess, always experiences 
great difficulty in adjusting his preconceived ideas of congressio-
nal life to the strange and unlooked-for conditions by which he 
finds himself surrounded after he has been sworn in and has be-
come a part of the great legislative machine. 
Nevertheless, as Wilson complained, this was an age of congressional 
dominance. There is little reason to assume the travails of the new 
member have changed, or changed much, except for one decisive fact: 
Greg Weiner  ·  A Madisonian Reform
69
Despite, in Wilson’s words, the freshman being not merely disappointed 
but also “disgust[ed] and dispirit[ed],” he seeks, often to the point of des-
peration, to stay. Members of Congress overwhelmingly seek re-election 
even as they complain about their lack of influence.
In historical terms, this is new. The Congressional Research Service 
has found that the average tenure of a House member during the 19th 
century varied between 18 months and three years. In the 49th Congress, 
which sat when Wilson published his broadside against congressional 
power, the average length of service in the House barely topped two 
years, and more than one in five members chose not to seek re-election. 
Resignations were likewise common.
Congressional tenure mounted over the course of the 20th century 
to today’s average of nearly 10 years in the House, with nearly 90% of 
members seeking re-election. Yet therein lies a Madisonian mystery: 
This is precisely the period over which Congress was steadily drained of 
power. The position seems to have become more alluring precisely as it 
has become less powerful.
Why? It may be because something else happened over the 20th 
century: The United States became a global power; the domestic respon-
sibilities of the national government swelled; and consequently the aura 
of Washington’s power shone more brightly. Theodore Lowi noted that 
at the beginning of the 20th century, most citizens could go from cradle 
to grave without interacting with the national government, while the 
State Department could fund its budget solely through consular fees.
Those days are gone, of course, but the change has arguably altered 
the motives of members of Congress, for whom the attraction of status 
is now a possible motive when it was empirically unattainable before. 
Why surrender power? Because shedding the content protects the shell, 
and it is the shell that creates the aura. Exercising power means mak-
ing choices; making choices, in turn, makes enemies. The member of 
Congress who can issue bromides without being responsible for choices 
has a unique electoral advantage.
Of course, there are exceptions to this, as there are to all rules. There 
are both conscientious members of Congress and periods of intense 
partisanship — as at the present — when they seem ideologically if not 
institutionally loyal. Both explanations, however, go only so far. 
In the former case, we should expect members of Congress who ar-
rive hoping to exercise power to leave when they find it is unavailable 
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to them. Instead we find them clinging fervently to the office, which 
suggests they are either in the grip of perpetually disappointed hope, or 
else driven by some other motive.
The explanation of ideological rather than institutional loyalty, 
meanwhile, commodifies members of Congress. If the thesis of ideologi-
cal loyalty is true, one member should be as good as another, provided 
his name is followed by the desirable partisan label. The next man up 
ought to suffice, which suggests the principled explanation’s utility is 
limited: A member of Congress devoted to a principle of supporting or 
opposing the president should not care whether he or someone else of 
the same party occupies the job. Yet, ardently, they cleave to it.
There are exceptions, of course. Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania 
has fought to recover congressional authority over tariffs, in the course 
of which he was recently compelled to remind his colleagues, “We are 
not potted plants.” The need to specify this suggests that some consider-
able number of members of Congress are content with such a passive 
role. Why endure the indignities of campaigning in order to simply be 
a cog in the Wilsonian machine? The best that can be said is that they 
are biding their time to attain one of the leadership positions, which 
provide the few true perches for exercising congressional power. But this 
is a long game that few win, and the leadership, too, has been complicit 
in the erosion of congressional power.
Another explanation is the competitive nature of political people, 
which expresses itself through the relentless campaigns to which 
members of Congress are now subjected. Washington has been called 
Hollywood for ugly people. Yet to the extent members of Congress are 
celebrities, they are political Kardashians: famous not for any notable 
achievement but rather known for being known.
restoring the Power motive
Term limits might curtail these illicit motives for serving. They are, in 
fact, more promising for this negative purpose than for any affirmative 
ideal of the citizen-legislator. In brief, they make illicit motives less 
attractive. Under a regime of term limitation, the power motive is the 
last one standing, and there would be little reason to run for Congress 
save for it.
We may begin with the simple case. Because they make it impos-
sible, term limits supply a de facto solution to the desire for careerism 
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qua careerism. Equally simple, former members of Congress often win 
lucrative contracts with employers or clients because they have long-
standing friendships on which they can call. Term limits depreciate the 
currency of these relationships both because they will not develop for 
as long and, with friends rotating out of office on short timetables, they 
will not be as valuable. After years of failed attempts to restrict influence 
peddling, which have focused on regulating the peddling rather than 
devaluing the influence, term limits are the most powerful lobbying 
reform available.
To the extent members of Congress are motivated by their competi-
tive impulses, term limits simply short-circuit them, at least after an 
interval. Here, the point that the impossibility of limitless terms makes 
it less urgent to win every intervening election is especially important: 
Term limits may, in this sense, also be the most powerful campaign-
finance reform available, because they would reduce the monomaniacal 
focus on winning. They may not eradicate competitive motives, but 
term limits can help to dissipate them.
The most difficult case is what appears to be the most attractive mo-
tive: the aura of power and the status that attends it. Yet the psychology 
of celebrity is based on the perceived power of the person under con-
templation. Term limits can help redirect this motive by encouraging 
the actual exercise of power while defusing celebrity that attaches only 
to its longevity.
To be sure, the typical length of proposed term limits — 12 years for 
both chambers — is ample time in which to enjoy the allure of status. 
But public knowledge that these members are temporary might require 
them to do something to merit their fame. Were there a term limit on 
residence in Hollywood, celebrities would be forced to make enduring 
names for themselves quickly. They would consequently resist retaining 
a shell of celebrity status through outlandish behavior or small roles. 
They would, in short, arrive at Hollywood and Vine on the clock and 
meaning business.
Term limitation thus operates by a process of elimination. Illicit 
motives for serving would be unavailable. Ambition would be the last 
motive standing, and its compression would heighten its intensity. The 
results, again, might be twofold. The first is an alteration of the motives 
of those already in power. The second is that those altered motives might 
attract a different breed of politician to elected office who is interested 
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in exercising power for a brief period, not retaining office for a lifetime. 
This is not the citizen-legislator. It is the power-driven one.
oPPosition to term Limits
It may seem strange at first glance to call term limits a Madisonian 
reform. There is no record of his supporting it, and Federalist No. 49’s 
call for constitutional “veneration” warns against casual tinkering with 
the document. The framers themselves discussed term limits only in 
the context of the presidency. The circumstances of that office, which 
concentrate the whole power of the executive branch in a single person, 
differ from those of Congress. But the arguments are still instructive.
Federalist No. 72 notes that frequent rotation in office will lead to 
instability because of the inherent propensity of the new occupant of 
an office “[t]o reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor.” 
This argument seems less applicable to members of Congress, who do 
not have the individual power to impose their will on their branch of 
government. Similarly, the essay holds forth the prospect of corruption: 
A president who knows his time is short “might not scruple to have re-
course to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant 
as it was transitory.” Yet the corruption of which members of Congress 
are accused pertains more to the endless pursuit of re-election.
Hamilton’s argument that re-eligibility for office encourages good 
behavior is more pertinent, but still requires close attention. “This posi-
tion will not be disputed,” he writes, “so long as it is admitted that the 
desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.” 
That ambition, he says, will be diminished if presidents cannot formu-
late long-term plans and see them to fruition. 
But even the most generous proposals for congressional term limita-
tion — 12 years in each chamber — exceed the voluntary limits practiced 
by presidents until Franklin Roosevelt and the compulsory one since. It 
seems especially a stretch to say that House members, whose time hori-
zons are supposed to be short, would be consigned to short-range plans.
Madison addresses this issue in Federalist No. 63, concluding that 
short House terms are an appropriate means for holding members ac-
countable for the immediate consequences of their choices, while a 
six-year tenure for senators allows voters to hold them responsible for the 
long-range effects of policy. It is significant that, in either case, Madison 
associates the long run with a six-year Senate term, not limitless service.
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The short-range perspective might, however, manifest itself in an-
other harmful way: diminished attachment to the institution. That is, 
a member of Congress who serves briefly will be less institutionally 
loyal than one who can serve indefinitely. Yet the personal ambition 
Madison harnesses to move the constitutional mechanism does not 
require a love of the institution, only a desire to exercise the power it 
makes immediately available.
Others have argued that term-limited members of Congress would 
lack expertise and that power would therefore shift to staff and lobbyists 
who would possess the knowledge needed to govern. If it is true that 
governing is so complicated that members of Congress who serve less 
than 12 years are incompetent to the task, then the regime has become 
too convoluted and detailed to be compatible with self-government. If 
anything, the complexity of government may be a case for longer but 
not unlimited House terms. 
Regardless, it seems unlikely that assertive members of Congress, 
guided by clear principles and assisted by robust staff, could not man-
age the task of governing. Presidents hit the ground running rather 
than waiting to compile expertise, as members of a freshman class of 
the House often do. Federalist No. 53 bolsters this case by noting that 
successful legislators must have “upright intention,” “sound judgment,” 
and “a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to 
legislate.” Some of this knowledge, Madison says, is “within the compass 
of men in private as well as public stations.” But two years, he argues, 
should be sufficient for that portion of expertise one must acquire on 
the job, especially given the limited number of issues that lie within the 
authority of the national government.
There is a danger, to be sure, of a tyranny of unaccountable exper-
tise. But this view treats initial terms for members of Congress like 
apprenticeships for the professional service that comes later. Given that 
the average tenure in the House is less than that envisioned by most 
proposals for term limits, this suggests such a tyranny is already in 
place. The best solution to that problem is devaluing the expertise by 
simplifying government.
Opponents of term limitation have also pointed out that the results 
of such measures with respect to state offices have been mixed at best. 
Term limits do not appear to limit spending or produce measurably 
better policy, for example. A study of term limits in California and 
N ational A ffairs  ·  Winter 2019
74
Michigan also concluded that they do not produce citizen-legislators. 
Rather, Stanley Caress and Todd Kunioka found that most offices con-
tinued to be occupied by career politicians who ran for another position 
when term limits precluded them from seeking re-election.
But the Madisonian case for term limits is not intended to alter pol-
icy in any particular direction; it is to alter the constitutional balance 
of powers. It does not disparage career politicians; indeed, the results 
of such studies parry the claim that term-limited members of Congress 
would be ignorant and easily manipulated. Nor does the Madisonian 
case seek amateur legislators. Rather, the idea is to alter the motives for 
holders of an office while they occupy it, regardless of where they came 
from or to what position they may later aspire.
In this sense, term limits would aim to alter the culture of Congress. 
That culture inherently differs from state legislative offices because of 
the gap in status that separates them. Regardless, from a Madisonian 
perspective, the question is not whether term-limited legislators are ca-
reer politicians but rather whether they are more assertive and whether 
the legislatures in question are more powerful vis-à-vis governors.
That said, term limits are a radical reform that would require alter-
ing the constitutional text. Conservatives are right to treat the idea as 
suspect. That is why it is so important to grasp its Madisonian character.
A  mAdisoniAn reform
In Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke distinguishes reformation 
from revolution. The former looks back to origins while the latter looks 
ahead to aspirational uplands. He opposes revolution so understood but 
recognizes that regimes must sometimes change for the crucial purpose 
of maintaining their original principles. “I would not exclude alteration 
neither,” Burke explains, “but even when I changed, it should be to pre-
serve.” Term limits are a conserving reform of this variety.
They are the product of a Madisonian political science that takes 
people as they are and, without excluding the practice of virtue, har-
nesses their interests. Madison’s political science more closely resembles 
Aristotelian induction from observed practice than the ground-up con-
structions of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, or Paine. 
Term limits seek to emulate the Madisonian method, and they are 
a reform for restoring Madisonian principles. The interests of mem-
bers of Congress have palpably changed since Madison explicated an 
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American variant on the separation of powers. A conserving reform 
is thus necessary to restore Madison’s machinery for maintaining the 
separation of powers — means and motives — while taking account of 
new variants of the latter. It is Madisonian not simply in method but in 
substance: The theoretical core of the American regime entails separa-
tion of powers maintained by counteracting ambition with ambition. 
Term limits aim to revive ambition and thus restart the machinery as 
originally designed.
They are not guaranteed, nor are they cost-free. George Will dedi-
cated Restoration to “Pat and Liz Moynihan and Jack and Sally Danforth. 
Were more of the people who came to Washington like these four, this 
book would not have been written.” There are unquestionably talented 
and conscientious statesmen who would be swept up in and excluded 
from service by a reform targeted at those whose motives are less noble.
But term limits must be viewed through an institutional rather than 
an individual lens. The benefit the nation gets from the conscientious 
few is outweighed by the erosion of the separation of powers at the 
hands of the careerist many. Term limits are ultimately a gamble on a 
long-term shift in legislative culture. It would be too glib to say we can-
not do worse than the status quo: We can, and term limits might. But 
they are rooted in timeless Madisonian arguments about maintaining 
the separation of powers. To the extent those assumptions are compel-
ling, term limits are a Madisonian reform that could induce a revival of 
Madisonian politics. They are worth a chance. 
